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1 Introduction
The management of land and natural resources is one of the most critical
challenges facing developing countries (Kaye and Yahya, 2012). In particu-
lar, natural resource exploitation is an industrial activity that has recently
been generating conflicts between firms and indigenous communities in many
countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Examples include Mexico
(Tetreault, 2015), Guatemala (Walter and Urkidi, 2015), India (Sosa, 2011),
Peru (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011), Sierra Leone (Akiwumi, 2014) and Indonesia
(Welker, 2009). Indirectly, land tenure also has a major influence in labour
policy (Dell, 2010). Another example is a restitution problem in Colombia
where two agents have rights over the land (Jaramillo et al., 2014).
In these land conflicts, there exist rights over the land for each side. For
the case of mining activities, article 10 of the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous People defined Free Prior and Informed Consent
(FPIC) as the principle that indigenous communities have the right to give
or withhold its consent to proposed projects that may affect the land they
customarily own, occupy or otherwise use (UN, 2007). On the other hand,
the mining firm has an investment and a concession over those lands, or,
even if a concession has not been granted yet, the firm may have a profit
opportunity high enough to make it possible to compensate the land owners
in a fair way (Helwege, 2015). In order to solve these land conflicts, it is
fundamental for the planner (e.g. the government) to have all the relevant
information about both sides.
In many situations, land identification and demarcation may be not clear,
as in the case of customary land (Gildenhuys, 2005; Azima et al., 2015). This
situation can lead to manipulation by merging or splitting of the communi-
ties, due to the fact that they may have incentives to strategically misrepre-
sent their identity in order to influence the final outcome to their own advan-
tage. The study of this kind of manipulation is common in the strategy-
proofness literature in the context of cost sharing (Moulin and Shenker,
2001; Sprumont, 2005; Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga, 2011; Ju, 2013; Masso´
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et al., 2015), resource allocation (Erlanson and Flores-Szwagrzak, 2015), job
scheduling (Moulin, 2007, 2008), indivisible object allocation (Sun and Yang,
2003; Svensson, 2009; Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015), assigning problems
(Kojima and Manea, 2010), and taxation problems (Ju and Moreno-Ternero,
2011), among others. Splitting and merging proofness have also been deeply
studied in bankruptcy problems where an estate E > 0 should be divided
among a set of claimants N with claims given by c ∈ RN . Several authors
(O’Neill, 1982; Moulin, 1987; Chun, 1988; de Frutos, 1999; Ju, 2003; Moreno-
Ternero, 2006, 2007; Ju et al., 2007) have showed that merging and splitting
proofness in bankruptcy problems leads to a proportional share of the estate.
See for example Thomson (2003, 2015a).
In this article, we assume that the government or planner seeks to assign
a price and amount of land fairly, stably and efficiently, and at the same
time, to guarantee non-manipulability by land reassignment. We model this
situation as a land rental problem, where there is a single tenant who can
be a mining firm, and several lessors who can be a group of communities.
Each community has some available amount of land ci with a reservation
price r per unit, that for simplicity we consider equal for all of them. The
mining firm needs to rent an optimal amount of land E, which is a completely
divisible object12. The mining firm assures an optimal profit K over E.
A rule determines, for each land rental problem, a quantity of land to be
rented by each community and a price that the mining firm must pay as a
way of compensation.
In order to study rules that guarantee non-manipulability, we propose a
version of strategy-proofness such that communities should not find it prof-
itable to re-assign the land among them. Also, we propose a version of land
monotonicity that assures fairness, in the sense that an increase in the quan-
1We can also consider other situations with similar characteristics, in the sense that
there are several land communities or owners, and a single agent who is interested in their
land. For example, construction of facilities (hotels, malls, convention centers, schools,
resorts, etc.), urbanisation in populated areas, or settlement of governmental bases.
2We use the terms c and E because of their resemblance to bankruptcy problems.
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tity of available land affects positively the final profits to both sides.
Our first result is a complete characterization of the family of rules that
satisfy land reassignment and land monotonicity. By adding a property in-
spired by standard for two-person in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), we charac-
terize a parametric subfamily. Another property is consistency, that states
that the rule should behave in a similar way independently of the number
of agents involved. This is a classical property in cooperative games (see
van den Brink et al. (2013) and Huettner (2015) for two recent applications),
and it has also been studied in bankruptcy problems (see Thomson (2008,
2015b) and references herein) and cost sharing problems (see for example
Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2007) and Koster (2012)). By adding consistency
and continuity we characterize another parametric subfamily of rules. The
intersection of both parametric subfamilies singles out two particular rules:
one of them optimal for the tenant and the other optimal for the lessors.
We organize the paper as follows: In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we study and characterize the family of rules that satisfy land
reassignment and land monotonicity. In Section 4, we characterize the family
of rules that also satisfy weighted standard for two-person. Finally, in Section
5, we characterize the subfamily of rules that satisfy land reassignment, land
monotonicity, consistency and continuity.
2 The model
Let N+ = {1, 2, . . . } be the set of potential lessors and let N be the set
of non-empty finite subsets of N+. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a generic set
of lessors, and let S be a generic subset of N . Given y ∈ RS, we write
y(S) =
∑
i∈S yi. Given x, y ∈ RS, we write x ≤ y when xi ≤ yi for all
i ∈ S. Moreover 0S denotes the vector (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RS. We denote the set
of nonnegative real numbers as R+, and the set of positive real numbers as
R++.
A land rental problem is a tuple (N0, µ, c, r) where N0 = {0} ∪ N is the
4
set of agents with 0 the unique tenant and N the set of lessors, c ∈ RN++
is the vector whose coordinates represent the amount of available land for
each lessor, r ∈ R+ is the reservation price per unit of land for lessors, and
µ : R+ → R is a function that assign to each amount of land the tenant’s
profit when that amount is rented. Hence, the aggregate profit when the
tenant rents l units of land is µ(l) + r(c(N)− l). We normalise µ(0) = 0, and
assume there exists a unique E ∈]0, c(N)] such that µ(E) + r(c(N) − E) is
maximum3 on [0, c(N)]4. We then denote K = µ(E) as the optimal profit
that the agents can obtain. This implies that K > rE, i.e. there exists
benefit of cooperation.
Under these conditions, an efficient allocation implies that the amount of
rented land is E and the profit of the tenant is K. Thus, only E and K are
relevant. Furthermore, for convenience we use N instead of N0. Hence, we
denote the land rental problem as (N,K,E, c, r) instead of (N0, µ, c, r). Let
L be the set of all land rental problems.
A feasible agreement is a pair (x, p) ∈ RN+ × R+ with x ≤ c, where xi is
the land rented by lessor i ∈ N , and p is the price per unit of land. The
set of feasible agreements on a land rental problem L is denoted as AL. Let
A = ⋃L∈LAL be the set of all potential feasible agreements.
Given (x, p) ∈ AL, the utility for tenant and each lessor i ∈ N are
u0(x, p) = µ(x(N))− px(N) and ui(x, p) = (p− r)xi, respectively.
We define a rule as a function ψ : L −→ A that assigns to each problem
L = (N,K,E, c, r) ∈ L a pair (x, p) = ψ(L) ∈ AL, satisfying:
(i) x(N) = E,
(ii) p(N,αK, βE, βc, α
β
r) = α
β
p(N,K,E, c, r) and x(N,αK, βE, βc, α
β
r) =
βx(N,K,E, c, r) for all α, β > 0,
(iii) r ≤ p ≤ K
E
.
3Since rc(N) is constant, this condition is equivalent to µ(E)− rE be maximum.
4This condition holds, for example, when µ is increasing and strictly concave.
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The first condition (efficiency) says that the amount of land rented is opti-
mal. The second condition (scale invariance) says that the final price and
the amount of land rented are independent of changes of scale. The third
condition (individual rationality) says that the lessors get at least zero (this
is implied by r ≤ p), and under efficiency, the tenant also gets at least zero
(this is implied by p ≤ K
E
). Under efficiency, the utility of the tenant can be
rewritten as u0(x, p) = K − pE.
There exist two special classes of rules: On the one hand, a rule is optimal
for tenant when the price is given by p = r. In that case, xi is irrelevant for
each i ∈ N , because their payoffs are zero, and so the final payoff allocation
is unique. On the other hand, a rule is optimal for lessors when the price is
given by p = K
E
. In the latter case, there are many possible payoff allocations
when E > c(N), all of them giving zero to the tenant.
3 Land reassignment and monotonicity
Since there may be no official registration and demarcation of the customary
land, the lessors can reach an agreement of reallocating it in order to share
extra benefits so created under a rule. For the planner it is not possible to see
this customary land situation, and it may be hard to get the outcome that
the rule is supposed to attain. In our context manipulation implies that the
lessors will benefit by merging or splitting under reallocating their land. Our
aim is to fully identify rules that are free from this concern. We formalise
this property as follows.
Land Reassignment (LR) Given (N,K,E, c, r), (N ′, K,E, c′, r) ∈ L such
that ci = c
′
i for all i ∈ S = N ∩N ′ and c(N \ S) = c′(N ′ \ S),∑
i∈N\S
ui(ψ(N,K,E, c, r)) =
∑
i∈N ′\S
ui(ψ(N
′, K,E, c′, r)).
If the right-hand side of expression is larger than the left-hand side and
the problem is (N,K,E, c, r), then lessors in N \ S can gain by reallocating
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their land so that the problem becomes (N ′, K,E, c′, r). Analogously, if the
left-hand side of expression is larger than the right-hand side and the problem
is (N ′, K,E, c′, r), then lessors in N ′\S can gain by reallocating their land so
that the problem becomes (N,K,E, c, r). S is the set of lessors that remain
unchanged (S = ∅ is also possible). This property avoids lessors to have
incentives for merging or splitting by reallocating their land.
The following property says that an increase of the available land is
(weakly) beneficial for everyone involved.
Land Monotonicity (LM) Given (N,K,E, c, r), (N,K,E, c′, r) ∈ L,
(i) c ≤ c′ implies u0(ψ(N,K,E, c, r)) ≤ u0(ψ(N,K,E, c′, r)), and
(ii) for each i ∈ N , ci ≤ c′i and cj = c′j for all j ∈ N \ {i} imply
ui(ψ(N,K,E, c, r)) ≤ ui(ψ(N,K,E, c′, r)).
Under this property, the tenant will be weakly better off when there are
more available land. Furthermore, when only one lessor has more available
land and the rest of lessors remain unchanged, this lessor will be weakly
better off.
Let F be the set of functions f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with f(t) ≥ t for all
t ∈ [0, 1]. Now, we consider the family of rules defined by p = K
E
f( rE
K
) for
some f ∈ F and xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N . So, we obtain different rules with
different functions f ∈ F . These functions determine the price, whereas the
among of land is always divided proportionally, in line with the known results
on invariance under reassignment in cost ans surplus sharing (cf. Theorem
1.1 in Moulin (2002)).
Figure 1 represents six examples of these functions.
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f(t) = t
(a)
1
1
f(t) = 1
(b)
1
1
f(t)
(c)
1
1
f(t) = 1
f(t) = θt
(d)
1
1
f(t) = t+1
2
(e)
1
1
f(t) = 1
f(t) = θt
(f)
Figure 1: Examples of functions in F that determine six different rules,
including an optimal rule for the tenant (a) and an optimal rule for the
lessors (b).
Theorem 3.1 A rule ψ satisfies LR and LM if and only if there exists f ∈ F
such that the price is given by p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and, when p 6= r, the assigned
amount of land is given by xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
Proof. (⇐) Let ψ be a rule given by p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
for some f ∈ F and,
when p 6= r, xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N . We will prove that ψ satisfies LR
and LM. In order to prove that ψ satisfies LR, let L = (N,K,E, c, r) ∈
L, L′ = (N ′, K,E, c′, r) ∈ L and S = N ∩ N ′ given as the definition of
LR. Let t = rE
K
∈ [0, 1[. On the one hand, we have ∑i∈N\S ui(ψ(L)) =∑
i∈N\S
(
K
E
f (t)− r) ciE
c(N)
= K (f (t)− t)
(
1− c(S)
c(N)
)
. Analogously, on the
other hand, we have
∑
i∈N ′\S ui(ψ(L
′)) = K (f (t)− t)
(
1− c′(S)
c′(N ′)
)
. Since
c(N \S) = c′(N ′ \S) and ci = c′i for all i ∈ S, we have that c(S) = c′(S) and
c(N) = c′(N ′). Hence the last two expressions coincide. We now prove that
ψ satisfies LM. Let L and L′ = (N,K,E, c′, r) ∈ L given as in the definition
of LM. If c ≤ c′, then, by efficiency, u0(ψ(L)) = K− KE f
(
rE
K
)
E = u0(ψ(L
′)),
hence condition (i) holds. If ci ≤ c′i and cj = c′j for all j ∈ N \ {i} then
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ui (ψ(L)) =
(
K
E
f
(
rE
K
)− r) ciE
c(N)
≤ (K
E
f
(
rE
K
)− r) c′iE
c′(N) = ui (ψ (L
′)) for all
i ∈ N , hence condition (ii) also holds.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies LR and LM. For simplicity, we write
(x, p) instead of ψ(N,K,E, c, r), (x′, p′) instead of ψ(N ′, K,E, c′, r) and so
on. Furthermore, we write ui instead of ui(x, p), u
′
i instead of ui(x
′, p′) and
so on. We proceed by series of claims.
Claim 3.1 If K = E = 1 and N = {1}, then the price p does not depend
on c.
Proof. By LM, if c1 ≤ c′1, then u0 ≤ u′0. By efficiency, u0 ≤ u′0 can be
rewritten as 1 − p ≤ 1 − p′, hence p ≥ p′ (the higher c1, the higher p).
Analogously, c1 ≤ c′1 implies u1 ≤ u′1 and p ≤ p′ (the higher c1, the lower p).
Therefore, p = p′. 
We define f(t) = p({1}, 1, 1, (1), t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. By individual ratio-
nality, t ≤ p({1}, 1, 1, (1), t) ≤ 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1], so f ∈ F .
Claim 3.2 If K = E = 1, then p = f(r).
Proof. By LR, u(N) = u1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (c(N)), r)). Under Claim 3.1 and
efficiency, this is equal to p({1}, 1, 1, (1), r) − r, hence u(N) = f(r) − r.
Furthermore, by efficiency, u(N) =
∑
i∈N(p − r)xi = p − r. Therefore, we
have p = f(r). 
Claim 3.3 p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
.
Proof. By scale invariance, p = K
E
p
(
N, 1, 1,
(
c
E
)
, rE
K
)
, and under Claim 3.2
we have that p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
. 
Therefore, the price is determined by Claim 3.3. Now we focus on the
amount of land x.
Claim 3.4 If p 6= r and there exist i, j ∈ N such that ci = cj, then xi = xj.
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Proof. Fix α ∈ N \N . We define (N iα, K,E, ciα, r) ∈ L, where N iα = {i, α},
ciαi = ci and c
iα
α = c(N \{i}). Since N ∩N iα = {i}, then by LR, u(N \{i}) =
uiα(N iα \ {i}). Under Claim 3.3 and p 6= r, we obtain x(N \ {i}) = xiαα .
Furthermore, by efficiency x(N \{i})+xi = E and xiαi +xiαα = E. From these
last three equalities we obtain that xi = x
iα
i . We define (N
jα, K,E, cjα, r) ∈
L, where N jα = {j, α}, cjαj = ciαi = ci = cj and cjαα = ciαα . Since N iα ∩N jα =
{α} and ciαi = cjαj , by LR, ui(xiα, piα) = uj(xjα, pjα). Under Claim 3.3 and
p 6= r, we obtain xiαi = xjαj . Since N jα ∩N = {j} and cjαα = c(N \ {j}), by
LR, uα(x
jα, pjα) = u(N \ {j}), and under Claim 3.3 and p 6= r, we obtain
xjαα = x(N \ {j}). Furthermore, by efficiency we have xjαj + xjαα = E and
xj +x(N \ {j}) = E. So, from these last three equalities we obtain xjαj = xj.
Then, from xi = x
iα
i , x
iα
i = x
jα
j and x
jα
j = xj we get that xi = xj. 
Claim 3.5 If N = {i, j}, p 6= r and ci, cj ∈ Q, then xi = ciEci+cj and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
.
Proof. Assume ci =
ai
bi
and cj =
aj
bj
where a and b are non-negative integers.
Let N i, N j ⊂ N \ N with N i ∩ N j = ∅, |N i| = aibj and |N j| = ajbi.
We define (N∗i, K,E, c∗i, r) ∈ L with N∗i = N i ∪ {j} and c∗ik = 1bibj for
all k ∈ N i and c∗ij = cj. Since N ∩ N∗i = {j} and c∗i(N∗i \ j) = ci,
by LR, ui = u
∗i(N∗i \ {j}). Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write
(p − r)xi = (p − r)x∗i(N∗i \ {j}). Since p 6= r, xi = x∗i(N∗i \ {j}). We
now define (N∗ij, K,E, c∗ij, r) ∈ L with N∗ij = N i ∪ N j and c∗ijk = 1bibj for
all k ∈ N∗ij. Since c∗i(N∗i \ {j}) = c∗ij(N∗ij \ N j), N∗i ∩ N∗ij = N i and
c∗ij(N∗ij \ N i) = ∑ajbil=1 1bibj = cj = c∗ij , by LR, u∗ij = u∗ij(N∗ij \ N i). Under
Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p−r)x∗ij = (p−r)x∗ij(N∗ij \N i). Since
p 6= r, x∗ij = x∗ij(N∗ij \ N i) = x∗ij(N j). On the one hand, by efficiency,
xi + xj = E and x
∗i(N∗i \ {j}) + x∗ij = E. Since xi = x∗i(N∗i \ {j}) and
x∗ij = x
∗ij(N j), we obtain xj = x∗ij(N j). On the other hand, by efficiency,
x∗i(N∗i\{j})+x∗ij = E and x∗ij(N i)+x∗ij(N j) = E. Since xi = x∗i(N∗i\{j})
and x∗ij = x
∗ij(N j), we obtain xi = x∗ij(N i). We have (N∗ij, K,E, c∗ij, r)
with N∗ij ∩ N = ∅ and c∗ij(N∗ij) = c(N). By LR, u∗ij(N∗ij) = u(N).
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By p 6= r and Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write x∗ij(N∗ij) = x(N).
Under Claim 3.4 and efficiency, we obtain that x∗ijk =
E
|N∗ij | =
E
aibj+ajbi
for all
k ∈ N∗ij. By efficiency and xj = x∗ij(N j), we have that xi = E − x∗ij(N j).
Under Claim 3.4, this is equivalent to write xi = E−ajbix∗ijk for each k ∈ N∗ij.
Since x∗ijk =
E
aibj+ajbi
for all k ∈ N∗ij, we have xi = E − ajbiEaibj+ajbi = ciEci+cj .
Analogously, xj =
cjE
ci+cj
. 
Claim 3.6 If N = {i, j}, p 6= r and cj ∈ Q, then xi = ciEci+cj and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
.
Proof. Assume first ci + cj = E. Then,
ciE
ci+cj
= ci and
cjE
ci+cj
= cj. By
efficiency, xi = ci and xj = cj. Therefore, xi =
ciE
ci+cj
and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
. Assume
now ci + cj > E. Let {csi}∞s=1 be a decreasing sequence of rational numbers
that converges to ci. For each s, we take (N,K,E, c
s, r) ∈ L with cs = (csi , cj).
Under Claim 3.5, we have xs =
( csiE
csi+cj
,
cjE
csi+cj
)
. By LM, ui(x, p) ≤ ui(xs, ps).
Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p−r)xi ≤ (p−r)xsi . Since p 6= r,
this is equivalent to xi ≤ xsi . Under Claim 3.5, this is equivalent to write xi ≤
csiE
csi+cj
. Hence, xi ≤ ciEci+cj . Let {ĉsi}∞s=1 be an increasing sequence of positive
rational numbers that converges to ci and such that L̂
s = (N,K,E, ĉs, r) ∈
L, where ĉs = (ĉsi , cj). We can find such a sequence because ci > 0 and
ci + cj > E. Under Claim 3.5, we have x̂
s =
( ĉsiE
ĉsi+cj
,
cjE
ĉsi+cj
)
. By LM, ûsi ≤ ui.
Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p − r)x̂si ≤ (p − r)xi. Since
p 6= r, this is equivalent to x̂si ≤ xi. Under Claim 3.5, this is equivalent to
write
ĉsiE
ĉsi+cj
≤ xi. Hence, ciEci+cj ≤ xi. Since xi ≤ ciEci+cj and ciEci+cj ≤ xi, we
obtain xi =
ciE
ci+cj
. By efficiency, xj = E − xi. Since xi = ciEci+cj , we deduce
xj = E − ciEci+cj =
cjE
ci+cj
. 
Claim 3.7 If N = {i, j} and p 6= r, then xi = ciEci+cj and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
.
Proof. Assume first ci + cj = E. Then,
ciE
ci+cj
= ci and
cjE
ci+cj
= cj. By
efficiency, xi = ci and xj = cj. Therefore, xi =
ciE
ci+cj
and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
. Assume
now ci + cj > E. Let {csj}∞s=1 a decreasing sequence of rational numbers that
converges to cj. For each s, we take (N,K,E, c
s, r) ∈ L with cs = (ci, csj).
Under Claim 3.6, we have xs =
(
xi,
csjE
ci+csj
)
. By LM, uj(x, p) ≤ uj(xs, ps).
11
Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p − r)xj ≤ (p − r)xsj . Since
p 6= r, this is equivalent to xj ≤ xsj =
csjE
ci+csj
. Hence, xj ≤ cjEci+cj . Let
{ĉsj}∞s=1 be an increasing sequence of rational numbers that converges to cj
and such that L̂s = (N,K,E, ĉs, r) ∈ L, where ĉs = (ci, ĉsj). We can find
such a sequence because ci > 0 and ci + cj > E. Under Claim 3.6, we have
x̂s =
(
xi,
ĉsjE
ci+ĉsj
)
. By LM, ûsj ≤ uj. Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write
(p−r)x̂sj ≤ (p−r)xj. Since p 6= r, this is equivalent to x̂sj ≤ xj, or
ĉsjE
ci+ĉsj
≤ xj.
Hence,
cjE
ci+cj
≤ xj. Since xj ≤ cjEci+cj and
cjE
ci+cj
≤ xj, we obtain xj = cjEci+cj . By
efficiency, xi = E − xj. Since xj = cjEci+cj , we deduce xi = E −
cjE
ci+cj
= ciE
ci+cj
.

Claim 3.8 If p 6= r, then xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Let i ∈ N , j ∈ N \ N and (N ij, K,E, cij, r) ∈ L with N ij = {i, j},
ciji = ci and c
ij
j = c(N \ {i}). By efficiency, xi = E − x(N \ {i}). By LR and
p 6= r, we have x(N \ {i}) = xijj , so that xi = E − xijj . Under Claim 3.7,
xijj =
cijj E
ciji +c
ij
j
. Hence, xi = E − c
ij
j E
ciji +c
ij
j
= E − c(N\{i})E
ci+c(N\{i}) =
ciE
c(N)
. 
Therefore, the amount of land is determined by Claim 3.8. 
We denote ψf as the rule corresponding to f ∈ F that is given by p =
K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
, and xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
4 Weighted standard for two-person
We study a property that is inspired on the so called standard for two-person
property by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). This property follows a “divide the
surplus equally” idea for two-person situations. In our context, the two-
person case arises when |N | = 1, i.e. the only agents are the tenant and
a single lessor. Standard for two-person says that both the tenant and the
lessor obtain equal benefit. We formalize this property as follows. Let L2 be
the set of land rental problems with a unique lessor.
Standard for 2-person (S2) Given L = ({1}, K,E, c, r) ∈ L2,
u0 (ψ(L)) = u1 (ψ(L)) .
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Next theorem characterizes the unique rule that satisfies LR, LM and S2.
The function that determines this rule is represented in Figure 1(e).
Theorem 4.1 A rule ψ satisfies LR, LM and S2 if and only if the price is
given by p = K+rE
2E
and the amount of land is given by xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
Proof. (⇐) Let ψ be a rule given by p = K+rE
2E
and xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
It is straightforward to check that ψ = ψf with f(t) = 1+t
2
for all t and
p = K+rE
2E
. By Theorem 3.1, ψ satisfies LR and LM. So, we just need to
prove that u0(ψ({1}, K,E, c, r)) = u1(ψ({1}, K,E, c, r)). The left side of the
equality is equal to K − K+rE
2E
E = K−rE
2
. Analogously, the right side of the
equality is equal to
(
K+rE)
2E
− r
)
x1. By efficiency, x1 = E, and hence we
obtain u1(ψ({1}, K,E, c, r)) = K−rE2 . Therefore, the equality holds.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies LR, LM and S2. By Theorem 3.1 there
exists f ∈ F such that p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and, when, p 6= r, xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N .
We need to prove that K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
= K+rE
2E
or equivalently f(t) = 1+t
2
for t =
rE
K
∈ [0, 1]. By S2, we have u0 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (1), t)) = u1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (1), t)).
This is equivalent to 1− f(t)x1 = (f(t)− t)x1. By efficiency, x1 = 1, which
is equivalent to write 1 − f(t) = f(t) − t. Hence, f(t) = 1+t
2
. Finally, since
K > rE, we deduce p 6= r so xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N . 
Next, we generalize the standard for two-person concept in a nonsymmet-
ric way. Notice that S2 determines the final payoffs for two-person problems,
forcing both the tenant and the unique lessor to receive the same value. Since
tenant and lessor are not symmetric, we can reasonabely allow one side of
the market to extract a higher value than the other. In our context, since
the rules satisfy efficiency, it is enough to fix the relative payoff between both
agents.
Weighted Standard for 2-person (WS2) There exists ω ∈ [0, 1] such
that
(1− ω)u0 (ψ(L)) = ωu1 (ψ(L))
for all L = ({1}, K,E, c, r) ∈ L2.
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Next theorem characterizes the parametric subfamily of rules that satisfy
LR, LM and WS2. We can see three examples of functions that determine
these rules in Figure 1 (a), (b) and (e), respectively.
Theorem 4.2 A rule ψ satisfies LR, LM and WS2 if and only if there exists
ω ∈ [0, 1] such that the price is given by p = K−ω(K−rE)
E
and, when ω < 1,
the quantity of land is given by xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N.
Proof. (⇐) Fix ω ∈ [0, 1]. Let ψ be a rule given by p = K−ω(K−rE)
E
and,
if ω < 1, then xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N . By Theorem 3.1, ψ satisfies LR and
LM for f(t) = 1 − ω(1 − t) and p = K−ω(K−rE)
E
. Fix L = ({1}, K,E, c, r).
We just need to prove that (1 − ω)u0(ψ(L)) = ωu1(ψ(L)). The left side of
the equality is equal to (1 − ω)
(
K − K−ω(K−rE)
E
E
)
= (1 − ω)ω(K − rE).
Analogously, the right side of the equality is equal to ω(K−ω(K−rE)
E
− r)x1.
By efficiency, x1 = E, and hence we obtain ω(1 − ω)(K − rE). Therefore,
equality holds.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies LR, LM and WS2. Let ω ∈ [0, 1].
By Theorem 3.1, there exists f ∈ F such that p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and, when
p 6= r, xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N . It is clear that ω < 1 implies p 6= r. To see
why, notice that p = r implies u1 = 0, whereas u0 + u1 = K − rE > 0, so
u0 > 0, and by WS2, (1− ω)u0 = ωu1 = 0, so (1− ω)u0 = 0, which implies
ω = 1. We still need to prove that K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
= K−ω(K−rE)
E
or, equivalently,
f(t) = 1 − ω(1 − t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Let t = rE
K
∈ [0, 1]. By WS2 we have
(1 − ω)u0 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (1), t)) = ωu1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (1), t)). This is equivalent
to (1 − ω)(1 − f(t)x1) = ω(f(t) − t)x1, which by efficiency is equivalent
to write (1 − ω)(1 − f(t)) = ω(f(t) − t). Rearranging terms, we deduce
f(t) = 1− ω(1− t). 
Notice that, when ω = 1, we obtain an optimal rule for the tenant, and
when ω = 0, we obtain an optimal rule for the lessors. Given ω ∈ [0, 1], we
denote ψω as the rule corresponding to the function ψf with f(t) = 1−ω(1−t)
for all t and xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N . In particular, ψ 12 is the rule given in
Theorem 4.1.
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5 Consistency
Consistency is a well-known principle. Assume that there exists an agreement
on what the right price and land share are, and that some lessors take this
price and leave. The tenant and the rest of lessors can proceed in two ways:
On the one hand, they can keep the previous price and land share. On the
other hand, they can recompute the right price and land share following the
same principle as before in the new reduced land renting problem. This new
reduced land rental problem is defined as L′ = (N ′, K ′, E ′, c′, r) ∈ L given
by N ′ = N \S where S ⊂ N is the set of lessors that leave, K ′ = K − px(S)
is the new maximal profit of the tenant, E ′ = E − x(S) is the amount of
land that the tenant still needs in the new reduced land rental problem,
c′ = cN\S ∈ RN\S++ is the vector whose coordinates represent the amount of
available land, and r is the reservation price, which is equal as in the original
land rental problem. If this procedure always gives the same result for agents
in N0 \ S as before, we say that ψ is consistent.
Consistency For all (N,K,E, c, r) ∈ L and S ⊂ N such that x(S) < E,
ui(ψ(N
′, K ′, E ′, c′, r)) = ui(ψ(N,K,E, c, r))
for all i ∈ N0 \ S, where N ′ = N \ S, K ′ = K − px(S), E ′ = E − x(S)
and c′i = ci for all i ∈ N ′.
Next proposition characterizes the second parametric subfamily of rules
that satisfy LR, LM and consistency. We can see some examples of functions
that determine these rules in Figure 1 (a), (b), (d) and (f), respectively.
Proposition 5.1 A rule ψ satisfies LR, LM and consistency if and only if
there exist α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ β such that:
a) The price is given as follows:
a.1) If r = 0, then either p = 0 or p = K
E
for all L ∈ L.
a.2) If r > 0 and rE < αK, then p = β
α
r for all L ∈ L.
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a.3) If r > 0 and rE = αK, then p = β
α
r or p = K
E
for all L ∈ L.
a.4) If r > 0 and rE > αK, then p = K
E
for all L ∈ L.
b) The amount of land when p 6= r is given by xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N.
Proof. (⇐) Let α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ β so that the price and the amount of
land are given by a) and b), respectively. Let f ∈ F defined as follows: f(0) ∈
{0, 1}, f(t) = β
α
t if 0 < t < α, f(α) ∈ {β, 1} if α > 0, and f(t) = 1 if t > α.
Then, the price can be written as p = K
E
f( rE
K
). Hence, by Theorem 3.1, ψ
satisfies LR and LM. Let L = (N,K,E, c, r) and L′ = (N ′, K ′, E ′, c′, r) given
as in the definition of consistency. We will prove that ui(x, p) = ui(x
′, p′) for
all i ∈ N0 \ S, where (x, p) = ψ(L) and (x′, p′) = ψ(L′). Firstly, we prove
that p′ = p. We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: r = 0 and p = 0. In this case, f(0) = 0. Hence, p′ = 0 and p = 0.
Case 2: r = 0 and p = K
E
. In this case, f(0) = 1. Hence, p′ = K
′
E′ . Therefore,
p′ = K
′
E′ =
K−K
E
x(S)
E−x(S) =
K
E
= p.
Case 3: r > 0, rE < αK and p = β
α
r. Under a.2), we know that p′ = β
α
r
when r > 0 and rE ′ < αK ′. Since r > 0, it is enough to check
that rE ′ < αK ′. Equivalently, r (E − x(S)) < α (K − β
α
rx(S)
)
. Since
rE < αK, it is enough to check that rx(S) ≥ βrx(S). This is trivially
true when rx(S) = 0. Otherwise, it is equivalent to check that β ≤ 1,
which is true by definition.
Case 4: r > 0, rE = αK and p = β
α
r. In this case, p = K
E
β, so f
(
rE
K
)
=
β. Since rE
′
K′ =
r(E−x(S))
K−K
E
βx(S)
= rE(E−x(S))
K(E−βx(S)) and β ≤ 1, we have that
rE′
K′ ≤ rE(E−x(S))K(E−x(S)) = rEK = α. Hence, rE ′ ≤ αK ′. We will show that
f
(
rE′
K′
)
= β
α
rE′
K′ . We have two sub-cases: First, if rE
′ < αK ′, then it
holds by a.2) and the fact that p′ = K
′
E′ f
(
rE′
K′
)
. Second, if rE ′ = αK ′,
then f
(
rE′
K′
)
= f(α)
(rE=αK)
= f
(
rE
K
)
= β. Since rE ′ = αK ′, we obtain
that f
(
rE′
K′
)
= β
α
rE′
K′ . Hence, p
′ = K
′
E′ f
(
rE′
K′
)
= K
′
E′
β
α
rE′
K′ =
β
α
r
(rE=αK)
=
K
E
β = p.
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Case 5: r > 0, rE = αK, and p = K
E
. Since p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and p = K
E
, we
deduce f
(
rE
K
)
= 1. Moreover, rE
′
K′ =
r(E−x(S))
K−K
E
x(S)
= rE(E−x(S))
K(E−x(S)) =
rE
K
= α.
Hence, f
(
rE′
K′
)
= f(α). Since rE = αK and f
(
rE
K
)
= 1, we deduce
f
(
rE′
K′
)
= 1. Hence, p′ = K
′
E′ f
(
rE′
K′
)
= K
′
E′ =
K−K
E
x(S)
E−x(S) =
K
E
= p.
Case 6: rE > αK. In this case, p = K
E
. Under a.4), we know that p′ = K
′
E′
when rE ′ > αK ′. Since K
′
E′ =
K−K
E
x(S)
E−x(S) =
K
E
, it is enough to check
that rE ′ > αK ′. This is equivalent to check that r(E − x(S)) >
α
(
K − K
E
x(S)
)
. Equivalently, r (E − x(S)) > αK
(
E−x(S)
E
)
. Since
E−x(S) > 0, this is equivalent to rE > αK, which is true in this case.
We check now that ui(ψ(L
′)) = ui(ψ(L)) for all i ∈ N0 \ S. Assume first
i ∈ N \ S. We need to prove that (p − r)x′i = (p − r)xi. This is trivially
true when p = r. Hence, assume p 6= r. We need to prove x′i = xi. Since
c(N) = c(N \ S) + c(S), then x′i = cic(N\S)(E − x(S)) = cic(N\S)
(
E − c(S)E
c(N)
)
=
ci
c(N\S)
(
c(N)−c(S)
c(N)
)
E = ci
c(N\S)
(
c(N\S)
c(N)
)
E = ci
c(N)
E = xi. Assume now i = 0.
We check that u0(ψ(L
′)) = u0(ψ(L)), or K ′ − pE ′ = K − pE. By definition,
K ′ − pE ′ = (K − px(S))− p(E − x(S)) = K − pE.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies LR, LM and consistency. Under LR
and LM, by Theorem 3.1 there exists f ∈ F such that p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and,
when p 6= r, xi = cic(N)E for all i ∈ N .
Denote L = (N,K,E, c, r) and let S ⊂ N with E < x(S) and L′ =
(N ′, K ′, E ′, c′, r) be defined as in the definition of consistency. Hence, we
have ui(x, p) = ui(x
′, p′) for all i ∈ N0 \S, where (x, p) = ψ(L) and (x′, p′) =
ψ(L′). In particular, u0(x, p) = u0(x′, p′). By definition, this is equivalent
to K ′ − p′E ′ = K − pE, or K − px(S) − p′(E − x(S)) = K − pE. Since
E 6= x(S), we deduce p′ = p.
We will prove the existence of α and β with α ≤ β, such that the price is
given as in a). Or, equivalently,
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f(0) ∈ {0, 1},
f(t) =
β
α
t if t ∈]0, α[,
f(α) ∈ {β, 1} when α > 0, and
f(t) = 1 if t > α.
(1)
If f(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1], then α = 0 and β = 1 satisfy (1). Hence, we
can assume that there exists t̂ such that f
(
t̂
)
< 1. Let α = Sup{t : f(t) < 1}
and β = Sup{f(t) : f(t) < 1}. Then, f(t) ≥ t for all t implies α, β ∈ [0, 1]
and α ≤ β.
For each r ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈]0, 1[, assume L = ({1, 2}, 1, 1, (γ, 1− γ), r)
and S = {2}. So, K ′ = K − px2 = 1 − f(r)(1 − γ) and E ′ = E − x2 = γ.
Hence, we have L′ = ({1}, 1− f(r)(1− γ), γ, (γ), r).
So, p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
= f (r) and p′ = K
′
E′ f
(
rE′
K′
)
= 1−f(r)(1−γ)
γ
f
(
rγ
1−f(r)(1−γ)
)
.
Since p′ = p, from the last two expressions, we have
f
(
rγ
1− f(r)(1− γ)
)
=
f(r)γ
1− f(r)(1− γ) for all r ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈]0, 1[. (2)
In particular, for r = 0, we have f(0) = f(0)γ
1−f(0)(1−γ) for all γ. If f(0) 6= 0,
then γ = 1− f(0)(1− γ) for all γ, or equivalently, (1− f(0))γ = 1− f(0) for
all γ, which implies that f(0) = 1. Hence f(0) ∈ {0, 1}. This is the first line
of (1).
For t > α, we have f(t) = 1. This is the fourth line of (1).
For each r ∈]0, 1[, we define F r(δ) = rδ
1−f(r)(1−δ) ∈ [0, r] for all δ ∈]0, 1].
If f(r) < 1, then F r is a strictly increasing and continuous function, and its
inverse is given by Gr(t) = (1−f(r))t
r−f(r)t ∈]0, 1[ for all t ∈]0, r]. Given t ∈]0, r] and
r ∈]0, 1[ such that f(r) < 1,
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f(t) = f (F r (Gr(t))) = f
(
rGr(t)
1− f(r)(1−Gr(t))
)
(2)
=
f(r)Gr(t)
1− f(r)(1−Gr(t))
=
f(r) (1−f(r))t
r−f(r)t
1− f(r)
(
1− (1−f(r))t
r−f(r)t
) = f(r)
r
t.
Assume α > 0. Then we can fix r ∈]0, 1[ such that f(r) < 1. Hence,
f(t)
t
= f(r)
r
for all t ∈]0, r]. We will prove that f(t) = θt for all t ∈]0, α[,
where θ = f(r)
r
. For all t ∈]0, α[, there exists r′ > t such that f(r′) < 1 and
f(t)
t
= f(r
′)
r′ . If t < r, we can take r
′ = r, thus f(t)
t
= θ. If t ≥ r, then r′ > r,
thus f(r)
r
= f(r
′)
r′ = θ. Hence, f(t) = θt for all t ∈]0, α[. We will prove that
θ = β
α
, or equivalently rβ = αf(r). We have two cases:
Case I. If f(α) = 1, then β = Sup{f(t) : t ∈]0, α[} = Sup{θt : t ∈]0, α[} =
θα. Hence, θ = β
α
.
Case II. If f(α) < 1, then f(α)
α
= θ, so that f(t) = θt for all t ∈]0, α] and
β = Sup{f(t) : t ∈]0, α]} = Sup{θt : t ∈]0, α]} = θα. Hence, θ = β
α
.
Then, the second line of (1) is satisfied.
From Case I and Case II we can deduce f(α) ∈ {β, 1}. This is the third
line of (1). 
Given α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ β, we define ψα,β as the rule corresponding
to the function given in Proposition 5.1 with f(0) = 0, f(α) = β and such
that the amount of land is given by xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
Next property says that small changes in the land rental problem should
not cause large changes in the chosen allocation.
Continuity The price p and the amount of land x are continuous functions
on L.
The rules that satisfy LR, LM, consistency and continuity constitute a
particular subfamily of rules from the one determined in Proposition 5.1 and
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it is characterized in the next theorem. We can see examples of functions
that determine these rules in Figure 1 (a), (b) and (f).
Theorem 5.1 A rule ψ satisfies LR, LM, consistency and continuity if and
only if there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that:
a)
p =
 rα if rE < αKK
E
if rE ≥ αK
and
b)
xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N.
Proof. (⇐) Let α ∈ [0, 1] such that the price and amount of land are given
by a) and b) respectively. Part a) can be written as p = K
E
f( rE
K
) with
f ∈ F given as f(t) = t
α
if t < α and f(t) = 1 if t ≥ α. Hence, by
Proposition 5.1, ψ satisfies LR, LM and consistency. To prove it that satisfies
continuity we still need to check that p is continuous at the points where
rE = αK. Equivalently, limrE→αK+ rα =
K
E
, which holds trivially. Moreover,
xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N also determines a continuous function.
(⇒) Under LR, LM and consistency, by Proposition 5.1 there exist α, β ∈
[0, 1] with α ≤ β such that the price is given as in part a) of Proposition
5.1, and the amount of land when p 6= r, is given by xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N .
By adding continuity, we will prove that p = r
α
if rE ≤ αK and p = K
E
if
rE ≥ αK. Moreover, xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N . In this sense, we have thar p
is a continuous functions in ]0, α[∪]α, 1]. We still need to prove the following
cases:
i) If r = 0, by continuity, p = limt→0
β
α
t = 0 = t
α
.
ii) If rE = αK, by continuity, β
α
r = K
E
. Then, β = Kα
rE
= 1.
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We need to prove that xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N when p = r. Let Lt =
(N,K,E, c, rt) ∈ L with limt→∞rt = 0 and rt > 0 for all t. Therefore,
xti =
ciE
c(N)
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Then, under continuity of the land function,
xi = limr→0 ciEc(N) =
ciE
c(N)
. 
Notice that the functions provided in Theorem 5.1 are those ψα,β with
β = 1. In particular, ψ0,1 = ψ0 (rule ψω when ω = 0) is a rule optimal for
the tenant and ψ1 (rule ψω when ω = 1) is a rule optimal for the lessors.
These two rules are the only ones that belong to both parametric sub-
families defined at Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 5.1, respectively. Both rules
are characterized in the next proposition. We can see the functions that
determine these rules in Figure 1 (a) and (b), respectively.
Proposition 5.2 ψ0 and ψ1 are the only rules that satisfy LR, LM, WS2,
consistency and continuity.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that both ψ0 and ψ1 satisfy these prop-
erties. Let ψ be a rule that satisfies these properties. We will prove that ψ
is either ψ0 or ψ1. On the one hand, by Theorem 5.1, there exists α ∈ [0, 1]
such that p = K
E
when rE = αK. On the other hand, by Theorem 4.2, there
exists ω ∈ [0, 1] such that p = K−ω(K−rE)
E
for all r. Hence, given r = αK
E
,
we have K
E
= K−ω(K−rE)
E
, or ω(K − rE) = 0. There are two possibilities:
On the one hand, ω = 0 which gives ψ = ψ0. On the other hand, K = rE
and rE = αK imply K = αK. Since K > 0, we deduce α = 1 which gives
ψ = ψ1,1 = ψ1. 
A summary of the results is presented in Table 1.
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Property ψf ψω ψα,1 ψ
1
2 ψ0 ψ1
Land Reassignment Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes Yes
Land Monotonicity Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes Yes
Standard for 2-person - - No Yes* No No
Weighted Standard for 2-person - Yes* - Yes Yes Yes
Consistency - - Yes* No Yes Yes
Continuity - Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Table 1: Summary of the results. Symbol * means that this property, to-
gether with others in the same column, characterizes the family/rule.
References
Akiwumi, F. A. (2014). Strangers and Sierra Leone mining: cultural heritage
and sustainable development challenges. Journal of Cleaner Production,
84:773–782.
Albizuri, M. J. and Zarzuelo, J. M. (2007). The dual serial cost-sharing rule.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 53(2):150–163.
Arellano-Yanguas, J. (2011). Aggravating the resource curse: Decentralisa-
tion, mining and conflict in Peru. The Journal of Development Studies,
47(4):617–638.
Azima, A., Sivapalan, S., Zaimah, R., Suhana, S., and Yusof, H. (2015).
Boundry and customary land ownership dispute in Sarawak. Mediterranean
Journal of Social Sciences, 6(4).
Chun, Y. (1988). The proportional solution for rights problems. Mathematical
Social Sciences, 15(3):231 – 246.
de Frutos, M. A. (1999). Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem.
Review of Economic Design, 4(3):255–272.
22
Dell, M. (2010). The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita. Econometrica,
78(6):1863–1903.
Erlanson, A. and Flores-Szwagrzak, K. (2015). Strategy-proof assignment of
multiple resources. Journal of Economic Theory, 159, Part A:137 – 162.
Gildenhuys, J. A. (2005). Indigenous peoples’ rights to minerals and the
mining industry: Current developments in South Africa from a national
and international perspective. Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law,
23(4):465–481.
Go´mez-Ru´a, M. and Vidal-Puga, J. (2011). Merge-proofness in minimum cost
spanning tree problems. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(2):309–
329.
Hart, S. and Mas-Colell, A. (1989). Potential, value, and consistency. Econo-
metrica, 57(3):589–614.
Helwege, A. (2015). Challenges with resolving mining conflicts in Latin Amer-
ica. The Extractive Industries and Society, 2(1):73–84.
Huettner, F. (2015). A proportional value for cooperative games with a
coalition structure. Theory and Decision, 78(2):273–287.
Jaramillo, P., Kayı, C¸., and Klijn, F. (2014). Asymmetrically fair rules for
an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint. Social Choice and
Welfare, 43(3):603–633.
Ju, B.-G. (2003). Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems.
Review of Economic Design, 8(2):205–215.
Ju, B.-G. (2013). Coalitional manipulation on networks. Journal of Economic
Theory, 148(2):627 – 662.
Ju, B.-G., Miyagawa, E., and Sakai, T. (2007). Non-manipulable division
rules in claim problems and generalizations. Journal of Economic Theory,
132(1):1 – 26.
23
Ju, B.-G. and Moreno-Ternero, J. (2011). Progressive and merging-proof
taxation. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(1):43–62.
Kaye, J. L. and Yahya, M. (2012). Land and Conflict: Tool and guidance for
preventing and managing land and natural resources conflict. UN Intera-
gency Framework Team for Preventive Action. Guidance Note.
Kojima, F. and Manea, M. (2010). Incentives in the probabilistic serial
mechanism. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1):106 – 123.
Koster, M. (2012). Consistent cost sharing. Mathematical Methods of Oper-
ations Research, 75(1).
Masso´, J., Nicolo`, A., Sen, A., Sharma, T., and U¨lku¨, L. (2015). On cost
sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. Journal
of Economic Theory, 155:30 – 49.
Moreno-Ternero, J. D. (2006). Proportionality and non-manipulability in
bankruptcy problems. International Game Theory Review, 8(1):127–139.
Moreno-Ternero, J. D. (2007). Bankruptcy rules and coalitional manipula-
tion. International Game Theory Review, 9(2):411–424.
Morimoto, S. and Serizawa, S. (2015). Strategy-proofness and efficiency with
non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Wal-
rasian rule. Theoretical Economics, 10(2):445–487.
Moulin, H. (1987). Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other
methods. International Journal of Game Theory, 16(3):161–186.
Moulin, H. (2002). Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing. In Kenneth J. Arrow,
A. S. and Suzumura, K., editors, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
volume I, chapter 6, pages 289–357. Elsevier.
Moulin, H. (2007). On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting, and
transferring of jobs. Mathematics of Operations Research, 32(2):266–283.
24
Moulin, H. (2008). Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-
proofness. Games and Economic Behavior, 63:567–587.
Moulin, H. and Shenker, S. (2001). Strategyproof sharing of submodular
costs: budget balance versus efficiency. Economic Theory, 18(3):511–533.
O’Neill, B. (1982). A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Math-
ematical Social Sciences, 2(4):345 – 371.
Sosa, I. (2011). License to operate: Indigenous relations and free prior and
informed consent in the mining industry. Sustainalytics, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands.
Sprumont, Y. (2005). On the discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley cost-
sharing method. Econometrica, 73(5):1693–1712.
Sun, N. and Yang, Z. (2003). A general strategy proof fair allocation mech-
anism. Economics Letters, 81(1):73–79.
Svensson, L.-G. (2009). Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness. Eco-
nomic Theory, 40(2):227–245.
Tetreault, D. (2015). Social environmental mining conflicts in Mexico. Latin
American Perspectives, 42(5):48–66.
Thomson, W. (2003). Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy
and taxation problems: a survey. Mathematical Social Sciences, 45(3):249
– 297.
Thomson, W. (2008). Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting
claims. Social Choice and Welfare, 31(4):667–692.
Thomson, W. (2015a). Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy
and taxation problems: An update. Mathematical Social Sciences, 74:41 –
59.
25
Thomson, W. (2015b). For claims problems, compromising between the
proportional and constrained equal awards rules. Economic Theory,
60(3):495–520.
United Nations (2007). United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples (UNDRIP). Adopted by the General Assembly on 2 October
2007.
van den Brink, R., Funaki, Y., and Ju, Y. (2013). Reconciling marginal-
ism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation
of egalitarian Shapley values. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(3):693–714.
Walter, M. and Urkidi, L. (2015). Community mining consultations in Latin
America (2002–2012): The contested emergence of a hybrid institution for
participation. Geoforum, In press.
Welker, M. A. (2009). Corporate security begins in the community: Mining,
the corporate social responsibility industry, and environmental advocacy
in Indonesia. Cultural Anthropology, 24(1):142–179.
26
